United Nations S/2011/370

Security Council

Distr.: General
17 June 2011

Original: English

# Report of the Secretary-General on developments in Guinea-Bissau and on the activities of the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in that country

## I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to Security Council resolution 1876 (2009), by which the Council established the United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau (UNIOGBIS), and resolution 1949 (2010), by which it renewed the mandate of UNIOGBIS and requested me to report every four months on the situation in Guinea-Bissau and progress made in the implementation of the mandate. The report covers major developments since my report of 15 February 2011 (S/2011/73).

## II. Major developments in Guinea-Bissau

### A. Political and security/military developments

2. The reporting period was marked by positive developments contributing to overall political stability in the country. The deployment of an Angolan technical Security Sector Reform mission and the adoption of the Security Sector Reform road map developed by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries (CPLP) contributed to advancing the Security Sector Reform process. At the same time, the formulation of a common position on the process by the Presidency, the Government and the military leadership, as well as civil society organizations, allowed them to present to Guinea-Bissau's international partners a united front in addressing the challenges ahead of the consultations with the European Union under article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement.

3. In February and March, President Malam Bacai Sanha and the Government of Guinea-Bissau undertook intensive diplomatic efforts to advocate for greater understanding by the international community of the challenges facing the country. Prime Minister Carlos Gomes Júnior led a delegation to Senegal from 14 to 16 February, while the Minister for Foreign Affairs headed a separate one to Lisbon, Paris, Berlin, London and Brussels, from 13 to 25 February. The Minister for Foreign Affairs delivered a message from the President to his counterparts in Europe, suggesting that the suspension of cooperation with Guinea-Bissau and the



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application of individual sanctions would be counter-productive to the country's stability. At the same time, my Special Representative impressed upon the national authorities the need to take advantage of these consultations to address in earnest the issues that had prompted partial suspension of international support to the country.

4. The Prime Minister led a high-level delegation to the opening meeting of Guinea-Bissau's consultations with the European Union in Brussels, on 29 March. He presented to the Council of the European Union his country's response to the various concerns raised by the European Union, including on governance and the status of the investigations into the 2009 political assassinations. The Prime Minister emphasized the commitment of national authorities to consolidate stability through strengthening the rule of law and prioritizing Security Sector Reform. He called for support from the European Union, the United Nations, the African Union, ECOWAS and CPLP to help overcome the challenges ahead in reforming the defence, security and justice sectors, to enhance the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime, and to reduce the level of poverty.

5. In a communiqué released after the meeting, the European Union asserted that the events of 1 April 2010 were a serious breach of the Cotonou Agreement, while noting the swift response and positive spirit demonstrated by the Government and welcoming the information provided at the meeting. The communiqué listed what the European Union saw as the Government's obligations before full cooperation could resume, including: (a) the provision of a detailed timetable on the effective implementation of Security Sector Reform based on the national strategy adopted by the National Assembly and the subsequent legislative package drawn up with the support of the European Union; (b) the renewal of the military hierarchy in keeping with the recommendations of the ECOWAS/CPLP road map for Security Sector Reform; and (c) the conclusion of independent judicial investigations into the 2009 assassinations and the military events of 1 April 2010.

6. During an extraordinary meeting held on 15 March, the Council of Ministers agreed to implement the ECOWAS/CPLP road map. The Council prioritized the implementation of key activities in the road map, such as technical assistance, training for national protection units, and the preparation of a battalion for peacekeeping operations. However, it expressed reservations regarding the deployment of external police units expected to assist Guinea-Bissau with protection capacity.

7. The ECOWAS Summit of Heads of State and Government was held in Abuja from 23 to 24 March, and was attended by the President of Guinea-Bissau. The Summit adopted the ECOWAS/CPLP road map and decided to allocate $63 million to Guinea-Bissau, as part of the ECOWAS contribution to the implementation of Security Sector Reform. In that context, the Summit also approved the deployment of a technical assistance team to Guinea-Bissau to train and strengthen national *units in charge of protecting national institutions and key national figures, and to* contribute to protecting the national commission of inquiry into the 2009 assassinations and the setting up of a witness protection programme. The regional leaders urged Member States to provide, on a bilateral basis, further assistance to the armed forces of Guinea-Bissau, including training on peace support operations.

8. Meanwhile, the President chaired the launching ceremony of the Angolan security sector reform technical military cooperation mission in Bissau on 21 March

in the presence of the Angolan Minister of Defence, the Angolan Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the Executive Secretary of CPLP, my Special Representative and key national officials. During a subsequent meeting with my Special Representative, the Angolan Secretary of State pointed out the benefits of other international partners supporting Guinea-Bissau's Security Sector Reform plans and joining his country's efforts. He also stressed the crucial role of the United Nations in assisting national authorities with coordination, as well as the importance of operationalizing the pension fund for members of the armed forces and the police to facilitate the implementation of key Security Sector Reform strategies.

9. On 4 April, in a briefing session with political parties not represented in the Parliament, the Prime Minister explained that the presence of the Angolan security sector reform technical military cooperation mission was based on bilateral military cooperation agreements already endorsed by the National Assembly. That meeting was held in response to criticisms from those parties that felt that the Government had withheld information on the mandate and structure of the mission. On 13 April, the Prime Minister met with the four political parties represented in the Parliament to brief them on Guinea-Bissau's consultations with the European Union in Brussels and updated them on the presence of the mission, as well as on the prospects for the swift implementation of the ECOWAS/CPLP road map.

10. On 14 March, the parliamentary special commission on internal administration, local government and defence presented a report to the National Assembly on the outcome of its visits to the Ministries of Interior and Defence, undertaken from 15 to 23 February, and its meetings with the two Ministers and the Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces. The report highlighted the operational constraints facing the security and defence forces, and the urgent need to implement the organic laws passed by Parliament in 2010. On 20 May, the President returned the draft of the Organic Law on the Basic Organization of the Armed Forces to the Parliament and requested the inclusion of the post of Deputy Chief of General Staff in the structure of the armed forces. The revised draft is under consideration by the Parliament.

11. During the reporting period, the Voz di Paz (Voice of Peace) grass-roots participatory dialogue initiative launched the second phase of its research into the root causes of conflict in the regions of Biombo and Cachéu. This phase, which is scheduled to be completed in December 2011, will involve an in-depth analysis of the causes of conflict and recommend solutions to be implemented at local and institutional levels, in the areas of insecurity, poverty, access to justice, and the political dimension of tribalism.

## B. Economic and social developments

12. Despite a context of continuing economic fragility, the Government is pursuing the implementation of public administration and pub'ic finance reforms, including efforts to improve fiscal discipline. A moderate growth rate of 4 per cent is forecast in 2011, owing in part to positive prospects for cashew nut exports and public infrastructure works. However, inflation could reach 4 per cent, above the target of 2 per cent set by the West African Economic and Monetary Union, owing to international price increases in oil and basic commodities. The impact of rising oil and food prices in international markets gave rise to concerns over possible

socio-economic tensions in the country. The Government reduced import taxes on oil products at the beginning of March to mitigate the impact on the cost of living. However, following its consultations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Government decided to reverse this policy, and acknowledged that it would not be able to buffer international commodity price increases indefinitely.

13. Despite a substantial increase in cereal and rice production in 2010 and multiple initiatives by international partners to stabilize the level of national food production, including the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) and the World Food Programme (WFP), the overall food security situation remained fragile owing to a combination of low income of producers and high food prices. The results of the vulnerability assessment mapping conducted by WFP to assess food security, in close collaboration with the National Institute of Statistics, were released in March 2011 and showed that an average of 20 per cent of rural households were affected by food insecurity, among which 8 per cent by severe food insecurity. The regions of Quinara, Bolama, Oio, Cachéu and Biombo were most affected.

14. A mission from IMF visited Bissau from 11 to 23 March to assess progress under the Extended Credit Facility programme for the period June to December 2010. It noted that performance had been satisfactory and that the prospects for compliance with benchmarks in the Extended Credit Facility programme for January to December 2011 were promising. On 10 May, the Paris Club creditors announced a $283 million debt relief initiative after Guinea-Bissau reached the completion point in the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative in December 2010. Meanwhile, the IMF and the World Bank upgraded their presence in the country with the appointment of Resident Representatives.

15. The Government is finalizing its Second Generation Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. On 7 and 8 April, the Government, with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), organized consultations with national and international stakeholders to discuss the 10 principles for international commitment in fragile States, and to validate the findings of the surveys on the Paris Declaration and the Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States and Situations conducted in January 2011. The findings will be presented at the High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness in Busan, Republic of Korea in December 2011.

16. The African Development Bank dispatched three missions to Guinea-Bissau, from 27 February to 12 March, to monitor its education and administration capacity-building projects, from 21 to 30 March to discuss budget support with the Government, and from 27 March to 1 April to evaluate a health development project.

17. Within the framework of the UNDP/International Labour Organization (ILO) joint task force for job creation in post-conflict settings, a joint mission comprising UNDP/Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery and ILO experts from Dakar, Geneva, New York and Bissau, conducted a needs assessment in Bissau from 4 to 9 May. The mission identified entry points for the elaboration of a national employment strategy and a joint UNDP/ILO programme on job creation as a peace dividend to be supported by the Peacebuilding Fund.

18. An estimated 290,740 children were vaccinated during the first 2011 national polio vaccination campaign targeting children under the age of five. The campaign was conducted from 22 to 25 March by the Ministry of Health, with the support of the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) and the World Health Organization (WHO). The United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), UNICEF and WHO have also supported the Ministry of Health in revising the national action plan for accelerating the reduction of child and maternal mortality to meet Millennium Development Goals 4 and 5, which are related to child and maternal health.

## III. Implementation of the mandate of UNIOGBIS

### A. Strengthening the capacities of national institutions and support to inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation

19. UNIOGBIS and UNDP continued to provide technical support to the organizing committee of the national conference, which launched the preparatory regional conferences in May, with funding from Japan. From 22 to 25 February, UNIOGBIS, in partnership with Swisspeace, organized a workshop to enhance the capacity of 15 facilitators responsible for leading the consultations. On 19 April, a UNDP-funded retreat brought together members of a technical working group established to finalize the criteria for selecting the participants in the regional conferences in order to ensure an inclusive process. The retreat recommended, inter alia, that the number of participants in the regions should be increased and that gender and age balance be ensured. Finally, consultations with the diaspora living in Africa were held in Dakar, from 20 to 22 May, with UNDP support. The consultations with the diaspora living in Europe were organized in Lisbon on 26 and 27 May, with support from the Government of Portugal, and in the presence of the Prime Minister.

20. UNIOGBIS, in collaboration with the Faculty of Law of Bissau, completed eight training workshops for members of the ad hoc Parliamentary Commission for the Review of the Constitution, on 18 February. The mission will continue to support the constitutional review process, in particular by holding political dialogue at local and regional levels between parliamentarians and other national stakeholders on the best principles and political options, as well as grass-roots consultations to enhance the inclusiveness of the process.

21. From 30 March to 7 April, UNDP supported the creation of three civil conflict prevention brigades in Oio, Biombo and Cachéu regions, which are the most affected by chronic local conflicts. The brigades aim to bring together, inter alia, traditional authorities, youth, women, farmer organizations and representatives from the justice sector and the police, to facilitate conflict analysis exercises and support the implementation of action plans focused on capacity-building, awareness-raising and mediation through regular meetings among the various ethnic groups and between traditional leaders and the national authorities.

22. Furthermore, UNIOGBIS, in partnership with the office of the Prosecutor General and in cooperation with the United States Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, held a workshop on the protection of witnesses and special persons, on 13 and 14 April. The workshop enabled senior representatives of the criminal justice and law enforcement community, as well as representatives from

civil society, to collectively revise the draft legislation on the protection of witnesses and special persons in Guinea-Bissau, into which they integrated a victims' protection component, consistent with international human rights standards and the national human rights context. The revised draft will be submitted to the National Assembly after its review and approval by the Minister of Justice and the Council of Ministers.

## B. Support to the police, internal security and criminal justice systems of holistic Security Sector Reform

23. Since the launch by national authorities of the vetting and certification process for policing and internal security agencies in February, the National Mixed Technical Independent Commission, with technical and financial assistance from UNIOGBIS, has completed the registration of 1,954 police officers from the Public Order Police, Immigration, Border Guard and security information systems. The registration process is expected to be finalized by 30 June 2011.

24. Meanwhile, progress continued on building the first model police station in Bissau, which is now close to completion. UNIOGBIS has initiated planning to expand the project to other areas with support from the Peacebuilding Fund.

25. On 22 March, the Minister of Public Administration, on behalf of the Minister of Justice, launched the implementation process of the recommendations adopted by a series of workshops and seminars, organized by the Ministry of Justice in 2010 with support from UNIOGBIS, on enhancing cooperation and information exchange between the Public Prosecution services, magistrates and police investigators. This process will assist in the implementation of the national policy on justice, which was developed and adopted by the Government in January 2011, with the assistance of UNDP.

## C. Security sector reform coordination and the rule of law

26. During the reporting period, progress was made in the coordination of international assistance on holistic Security Sector Reform, at both technical and operational levels. On 7 April, the Permanent Secretariat of the National Security Sector Reform Steering Committee, with support from UNIOGBIS, convened the first of a series of bimonthly meetings with international partners, including Angola, Brazil, Portugal, the European Union, UNDP and UNIOGBIS, to exchange technical and operational information on current Security Sector Reform efforts and facilitate coordination of activities among partners.

27. An interministerial national validation commission was established by the Government of Guinea-Bissau to oversee the bidding process for the selection of the banking institution to host the pension fund, with the participation of international observers, including ECOWAS, the European Union and UNIOGBIS. On 29 April, the commission formally announced the selection of the Banco da Africa Ocidental to host and manage the pension fund, as recommended by independent experts commissioned by the Government with the support of the European Union.

28. As part of its support to the National Security Sector Reform Steering Committee, UNDP funded four regional awareness-raising and information

workshops on Security Sector Reform, with the technical support of UNIOGBIS, in March, April and May. The workshops targeted 200 participants from the defence and security forces, the judiciary, traditional authorities and civil society organizations.

29. On 11 May, UNDP and the Ministry of Justice convened a seminar on access to justice in Bissau, and the regions of Oio and Cachéu, to endorse the conclusions and recommendations of a study carried out between November 2010 and March 2011. The study highlighted that regional differences, in terms of crimes and use of formal, traditional or private dispute resolution mechanisms, depended on the capacity of formal justice service providers to meet the needs of the most vulnerable, in particular women and children. It also revealed frequent situations of private justice with community involvement that often escalated into serious conflict in the area. On 18 April, UNDP signed an agreement with the Ministry of Justice for the establishment of the Office of Information and Legal Consultation, as well as four centres referred to as "Access to Justice Centres", including two in Bissau, one in Cachéu and one in Oio, with a view to bringing justice closer to the people, in particular the most vulnerable groups. Two regional courts will be rehabilitated in the regions of Cachéu and Oio with the support of the Peacebuilding Fund. The centres will operate as legal aid offices, providing information on rights and the functioning of the justice system, as well as legal counselling and judicial representation to the most vulnerable groups. From 16 to 23 May, UNIOGBIS contributed to the training of legal aid officers on human rights international standards and human rights approaches to justice administration.

30. Following a request for assistance from the Government, UNIOGBIS and the United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) conducted a technical assessment mission from 13 to 19 February, with the direct involvement of the armed forces and in consultation with UNDP. The mission reviewed ammunition storage areas and stockpile management mechanisms, and inspected ammunition storage sites in Bissau and the regions of Buba, Quebo, Bafata and Gabú. The mission provided technical support for the identification and the destruction of more than four tons of unserviceable and dangerous munitions posing the most immediate threat to local populations. In addition, the technical assessment mission noted that there were 14 known ammunition storage areas that pose a significant risk, which could result in injury and death, including in the immediate vicinity of the Osvaldo Vieira International Airport in Bissau and the city of Gabú.

31. UNDP continued to provide technical assistance to the national humanitarian mine action programme through the National Mine Action Coordination Centre and the demining non-governmental organization, Lutamos Todos Contra as Minas (LUTCAM). During the first quarter of 2011, 171,000 square metres of inhabited land and farmland were demined, targeting a total of 14,600 direct beneficiaries, mainly in the north and south of the country. Fifty-five landmines, one anti-tank mine and 1,860 explosive remnants from the war were destroyed by Humanitarian Aid, LUTCAM and Cleared Ground Demining, an international explosive ordnance disposal non-governmental organization. Guinea-Bissau is on track to fulfilling its obligations in accordance with the Ottawa Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction.

## D. Human rights and gender monitoring, protection, promotion, capacity-building and mainstreaming

32. On 22 and 23 February, UNIOGBIS held a regional human rights and gender workshop for military officers to raise their awareness of human rights and gender issues, and assisted the Ministry of Defence with the formulation of training modules and the drafting of a manual for a training-of-trainers programme. UNIOGBIS continued to monitor the human rights situation in the country. During the reporting period, the Office dispatched a field mission to the southern regions of Quinara and Timbali to assess the human rights and gender situation, with special attention to the economic, social and cultural rights. UNIOGBIS also monitored conditions in prisons, advocating for the separation of detainees according to gender and age, and for the release or prosecution of those arbitrarily detained. In keeping with the recommendations of the 2010 universal periodic review, the Government ratified the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. The Government also invited the Special Procedures mechanism of the Human Rights Council to assess judicial bodies in Guinea-Bissau.

33. On the second anniversary of the March 2009 assassinations of the late President João Bernardo Vieira and the Chief of General Staff, General Tagme Na Waie, the Guinea-Bissau Human Rights League, lawyers and family representatives of the victims condemned the lack of progress in the investigations. On 25 March, my Special Representative facilitated a meeting in Dakar between members of the diplomatic corps accredited to Guinea-Bissau and the Prosecutor General for an update of the criminal investigations, in line with Security Council resolution 1949 (2010). On that occasion, the Prosecutor General disclosed that the judicial process faced political, financial and administrative obstacles, as well as security constraints. In his briefing to the European Union on 29 March, the Prime Minister confirmed that the investigations into the assassinations were ongoing, but remained inconclusive owing to a lack of evidence, the inability to hear key witnesses and little international assistance.

34. On 9 April, the United States Department of State released its 2010 Human Rights Report on Guinea-Bissau, which noted the lack of judicial independence and due process of law, as well as the lack of progress in the investigations into political assassinations and other politically motivated killings and violence that occurred in 2009. The report repeated references contained in the 2009 United States Department of State report regarding the involvement of military officers under the command of the current Chief of General Staff in the assassination of President Vieira. A Government communiqué, issued on 11 April, expressed solidarity with and praised the military leadership for contributing to stability. At the same time, it warned that the United States report was creating tension that could generate instability in the country. The United States Embassy in Dakar, in a press statement on 14 April, said that its Government stood by the report.

35. On International Women's Day, on 8 March, the Institute of Women and Children launched consultations for the formulation of a national policy on gender equality and equity, with support from the United Nations. Representatives of the Government and civil society organizations have developed a first draft, while consultations with leading ministries are under way. The Specialized Parliamentary Committee on Women and Children is currently revising draft legislation on

domestic violence to align it with the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child. On 15 March, the Gender Thematic Working Group held a retreat to assess its performance and ensure better coordination of gender activities. On 14 April, the Council of Ministers submitted draft laws to the National Assembly criminalizing human trafficking, including of children, and female excision. By a vast majority, the National Assembly adopted the two laws on 2 and 6 June, respectively.

36. The national steering committee on Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) continued to prepare its national action plan, while the Women's Political Platform initiated actions to enhance the political participation of women in local elections. UNIOGBIS has also pursued initiatives to mainstream a gender perspective within policing and military institutions. As a result of the advocacy role of UNIOGBIS, the Public Order Police approved, on 2 March, the creation of a sub-directorate for gender and the protection of vulnerable people, as well as a police gender training task force. Furthermore, on 25 March, the Military Women's Commission, with UNIOGBIS support, organized a gender sensitization workshop for senior officers in the defence sector.

## E. Support to national efforts to combat illicit drug trafficking, organized crime and human trafficking

37. Following the signing on 3 December 2010 of a memorandum of understanding establishing a Transnational Crime Unit within the framework of the West Africa Coast Initiative, a Transnational Crime Unit Management Board was appointed in February and the Director of the Judiciary Police was nominated as the first Chair. UNIOGBIS extended support to the newly appointed staff in charge of building up the capacity of the Transnational Crime Unit, which is expected to move into its new premises by the end of June.

38. On 15 February, the Office of the Prosecutor General issued specific instructions to all police institutions on procedures to be followed in case of drug seizures or drug trafficking, namely the exclusive competence of the Judiciary Police in the fight against drug trafficking, which marks an important step in the improvement of cooperation among law enforcement authorities.

39. Consistent with a request from the Prime Minister, UNODC initiated consultations with the Government on the operational plan to combat drug trafficking and transnational organized crime, for the period 2011-2014. A task force, comprising representatives of the Government, UNODC and UNIOGBIS, has been set up to revise the operational plan, expected to focus on criminal justice, law enforcement and drug demand reduction.

40. On 1 March, UNICEF and ILO supported training by the International Organization for Migration for the National Committee on Human Trafficking, on child protection and child labour. On 1 April, UNICEF and UNIOGBIS provided support to the Ministry of the Interior to conduct a "training of trainers" course for 20 police and border guards on combating child trafficking, including protection and assistance to children who are victims of sexual violence and children in conflict with the law.

41. Within the framework of the implementation of a Central Authority for International Judicial Cooperation and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters in Guinea-Bissau, UNODC organized, from 2 to 6 May, a study visit to the European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit (EUROJUST) and the European Judicial Network at The Hague and to the Portuguese Central Authority in Lisbon. A delegation of 12 national officials, including the Minister of Justice and the Prosecutor General, took part in the mission, aimed at exploring options for mutual legal assistance.

42. On 13 May, João Biaguê, a Prosecutor and staff member of the Bissau Faculty of Law, was appointed Director-General of the Judiciary Police, following the resignation of Lucinda Barbosa Ahukarié, who was allegedly subjected to death threats and undue pressure in the fulfilment of her tasks. Mr. Biaguê was officially sworn in on 30 May.

## F. Support to the work of the Peacebuilding Commission and the Peacebuilding Fund

43. On 24 February, the Guinea-Bissau configuration of the Peacebuilding Commission held a meeting in New York, attended by a high-level delegation from Guinea-Bissau, headed by the Prime Minister. The authorities of Guinea-Bissau and my Special Representative briefed the configuration on recent developments and the efforts undertaken by the Government to stabilize the country and to re-engage with key international partners. The Prime Minister reiterated his Government's commitment to the peacebuilding process and to the implementation of critical reforms, including Security Sector Reform. Since that meeting, the Chair of the configuration, Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, has sought to maintain and enhance the engagement of international partners in providing political support and financial resources for the efforts of the Government in peacebuilding, economic recovery and development.

44. Following my recommendation to allocate $16.8 million of the Peacebuilding Fund for the implementation of the Peacebuilding Priority Plan for Guinea-Bissau, UNIOGBIS, the United Nations country team and national authorities have been working together to revise the Priority Plan, in line with comments and recommendations made by the Peacebuilding Support Office. Technical working groups were set up to further develop strategies in the priority areas to be supported by the Peacebuilding Fund. The Peacebuilding Priority Plan is expected to be approved during the next meeting of the Joint Steering Committee in June.

45. The projects funded under the first Peacebuilding Fund allocation are at a final stage. On 2 June, the Minister of Justice declared the regional prisons in Mansoa and Bafata as operational during a launching ceremony held at both sites. The new directors, who are both women, and the new penitentiary guards reported for duty in the newly equipped and furnished prisons. The rehabilitation of Gabú and Quebo military barracks is near completion, while the delivery of equipment for the Amura fortress barracks in Bissau is under way. The vocational training and youth employment project was also completed at the end of March. UNDP, in close partnership with the Secretariat of State for Youth, Culture and Sports, will continue to monitor the release of microcredit by the banks responsible for managing the credit lines. By 31 March, 240 business plans prepared by young beneficiaries were

submitted to the banks; and 125 young people had already received grants to launch their income-generating activities.

### G. Regional cooperation, partnerships and resource mobilization

46. As part of his good offices, my Special Representative has impressed upon international partners the benefits of remaining committed to support Guinea-Bissau's efforts to consolidate stability. In this regard, he has maintained regular contacts with Guinea-Bissau's main international partners in Abuja, Dakar and New York, in particular ECOWAS and CPLP member States. UNIOGBIS also held regular exchanges with Angola, which is also the CPLP Chair, focusing on political developments and Security Sector Reform, including the work being carried out by the Angolan security sector reform technical military cooperation mission.

47. From 29 to 31 March, my Special Representative held consultations in Brazil with the Ministers for Foreign Affairs and Defence, as well as with other senior officials, including the Director of the Brazilian Cooperation Agency. The Brazilian authorities gave assurances of continued support for reforms in Guinea-Bissau, in particular Security Sector Reform, under the aegis of South-South cooperation. In Lisbon, my Special Representative met with representatives of CPLP member States on 1 April to review recent developments in Guinea-Bissau and discuss the ECOWAS/CPLP road map. He also encouraged them to maintain their engagement with Guinea-Bissau and to join Angolan bilateral initiatives in supporting national efforts.

## IV. Support to the implementation of the ECOWAS/CPLP road map for Security Sector Reform

48. On 24 March, the Heads of State and Government of ECOWAS adopted the road map for support to Security Sector Reform and stabilization in Guinea-Bissau. Consistent with the request by the Security Council to engage with ECOWAS and CPLP to jointly assess the requirements to support the rapid implementation of the road map, I deployed a technical assessment mission to Bissau and Abuja from 11 to 18 April. Led by my Deputy Special Representative in Guinea-Bissau, the mission included representatives from the Departments of Political Affairs and Peacekeeping Operations, the Peacebuilding Support Office, UNIOGBIS and the United Nations country team, and was undertaken in close consultation with the national authorities, the African Union, CPLP, ECOWAS, the European Union and relevant bilateral partners.

49. The mission recommended the prompt establishment by ECOWAS of a joint task force/coordination mechanism, with CPLP, the African Union, the European Union and the United Nations, to finalize preparations for the implementation of the road map to guide and monitor the implementation process. The mission also made several recommendations to improve the functioning of existing coordination mechanisms and to mobilize resources for the immediate launching and effective functioning of the pension fund system, as well as related initiatives such as reinsertion and reintegration. Specific recommendations were also addressed to national authorities, the African Union, ECOWAS, CPLP member States and other

bilateral partners, UNIOGBIS, the United Nations as a whole, and the Security Council.

50. On 4 May, my Special Representative shared the final report of the technical assessment mission with the President of the ECOWAS Commission and the Executive Secretary of CPLP. The report was subsequently endorsed by the two organizations. In the meantime, from 28 April to 2 May, the Ministry of Defence hosted a meeting with representatives of ECOWAS and CPLP to discuss mechanisms for the coordination of efforts of the two Organizations in the implementation of Security Sector Reform, in line with the recommendations put forward by the technical assessment mission. Discussions also focused on the need for a timely establishment of the pension fund.

# V. Cross-cutting issues

## A. Integration of the United Nations system/joint strategic workplan

51. At their joint retreat held on 17 March, the United Nations country team and UNIOGBIS endorsed a joint strategic workplan with appropriate benchmarks to measure and track progress on the implementation of the United Nations joint vision for Guinea-Bissau. Key elements related to the mandate of UNIOGBIS are set out in the annex to the present report. The joint strategic workplan is aligned with the other key strategic documents, including the United Nations Framework for Peace and Development in Guinea-Bissau (UNDAF+), the Second Generation Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper and the Strategic Framework for Peacebuilding in Guinea-Bissau.

52. The joint strategic workplan was built on a situation analysis that identified the main challenges in the country, such as fragile State institutions and poor governance, high levels of poverty and unemployment, and poor social conditions. The workplan aims to address these challenges through a number of tangible benchmarks in four areas, as outlined below. The indicators of progress, drawn from UNDAF+ and Security Council resolution 1949 (2009), reflect both the mandate of UNIOGBIS and the United Nations country team's focus on development, thus ensuring that development programmes contribute to peace consolidation. A key assumption is that the current policy environment will continue to be stable and that the priorities of both the Government and international partners will not change. It is expected that by the end of 2016, the United Nations, in cooperation with the Government and the international community, would have contributed to a stable political, security and socio-economic environment conducive to peace, development and respect for human rights.

53. In the area of governance, the United Nations system aims to support national authorities in: (a) organizing the national conference for dialogue and reconciliation and setting up follow-up mechanisms; (b) reviewing the Constitution and the legal framework for institutional reforms; (c) advocating for the continued engagement of development partners in national stabilization and development efforts; and (d) formulating a technical assistance programme for the preparation of the 2012 legislative elections.

54. With regard to economic growth and poverty reduction, the focus will be on: (a) assistance in organizing a donor round table, following the adoption of the Second Generation Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper; (b) promotion of employment, in particular for youth and women; (c) support to the Government in the implementation of its economic programme in partnership with IMF and the World Bank; and (d) improvement of the food security situation in the country.

55. On social protection and human development, priority activities will include: (a) support for the implementation of the high-level operational plan for the reduction of child and maternal mortality in Guinea-Bissau, as well as the national three-year plan for educational development 2011-2013, which includes strategies for primary and vocational education, and literacy; (b) advocacy for increased resource allocation and budget execution for all basic social services, including through the Fast Track Initiative; and (c) advocacy for the reduction of inequitable distribution of resources and human development outcomes.

56. Regarding Security Sector Reform and the rule of law, the focus will be on: (a) the implementation of a national holistic Security Sector Reform strategy, including support through the ECOWAS/CPLP road map; (b) demobilization in the defence and security sectors and progress in the vetting and certification process for policing and internal security personnel, in accordance with gender and human rights standards; (c) increasing access to justice for the most vulnerable and strengthening the justice sector, including penitentiary reform, to address impunity and combat drug trafficking and transnational crime; and (d) coordination and resource mobilization activities for the pension fund and related initiatives, including reinsertion and reintegration arrangements, through a high-level Security Sector Reform event.

## B. Public information

57. In mid-February, the United Nations launched a radio programme to disseminate information on its activities in Guinea-Bissau with a focus on Security Sector Reform and the preparatory process leading to the national conference. UNIOGBIS and UNDP continued to provide technical assistance to the national coordination team in charge of the Security Sector Reform awareness campaign, implemented by Movimento Nacional da Sociedade Civil para Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimiento (Civil Society National Movement for Peace, Democracy and Development) through a $30,000 grant sponsored by UNDP. On 23 March, the Governments of Guinea-Bissau and Angola signed a cooperation agreement for capacity-building and refurbishment of State media in the country. The Government of Japan also disbursed $60,000 to enhance the technical capacity of Guinea-Bissau national television.

58. On 14 April, the Council of Ministers decided to suspend the private newspaper *Última Hora*, whose coverage of the United States Department of State comments on the assassination of President Vieira was deemed excessive by the national authorities. The Guinea-Bissau Human Rights League, the Journalists' Union and Reporters Without Borders condemned the decision as a violation of freedom of expression. On 20 April, the Minister for Social Communication announced that the decision had been withdrawn.

### C. Staff safety and security

59. During the reporting period, there were no direct threats against United Nations staff in Guinea-Bissau. The crime rate remained at controlled levels. All security measures applicable to United Nations staff continued to be strictly enforced.

## VI. Observations

60. Since my last report, the national authorities of Guinea-Bissau and the country's international partners have taken commendable steps towards enhancing political stability in the country. I welcome the Government's constructive response to concerns raised by the international community, in particular the European Union, with regard to the rule of law, impunity and the role of the military in the political stability in the country. Continuous dialogue between national authorities and international partners is vital for enhancing peacebuilding and stability. In this regard, I was encouraged to note the unity of purpose shown by the State institutions in preparing for the important consultations in March with the European Union under article 96 of the Cotonou Agreement, and the inclusion of civil society and the military leadership in that process. I believe that this united approach, along with the open attitude to discussing contentious issues, contributed to a productive dialogue with the European Union. I hope that the issues will be successfully resolved, enabling the full resumption of European Union cooperation with Guinea-Bissau.

61. The efforts towards promoting a broad-based dialogue involving all stakeholders through the forthcoming national conference are encouraging. Preparations for this event are progressing well, although at a slower pace than planned owing to resource constraints. This is a cause of concern as the national conference will mark the first attempt since 1999 to engage all stakeholders, including at the grass-roots level, in national dialogue on the root causes of conflict and on possible solutions. In addition, the conference could put in place permanent and inclusive mechanisms of dialogue, which would strengthen democratic processes, promote reconciliation and help prevent conflict. I urge the main political stakeholders in the country to use the event as a legitimate forum in which to address key issues for the future stability and progress of the country. I appeal to Guinea-Bissau's international partners to continue to extend assistance to enable the holding of the national conference.

62. The approval of a political declaration and a plan of action on transatlantic drug trafficking by the Group of Eight (G-8) and Group of Twenty (G-20) Summit held in Deauville, France, following the G8+ ministerial conference held on this issue on 10 May, is encouraging. These documents will contribute to increased international cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking by involving countries of origin, transit and destination. I remain particularly concerned about drug-trafficking activities in Guinea-Bissau. The country's very limited resources and means to curb this threat to peacebuilding and to combat the illegal trafficking is worrisome, as is the absence of reliable information. I encourage Guinea-Bissau's partners to step up assistance to monitor these illegal activities and to contribute to the strengthening of national capacities to address the scourge in an effective and coordinated manner, within the framework of the West Africa Coast Initiative. I take

note of the appointment of the new Director General of the Judiciary Police, and encourage him to build on the reform programme initiated under his predecessor for enhancing the fight against drug trafficking and transnational organized crime, and to fulfil the obligations subscribed by the Government of Guinea-Bissau, especially within the framework of the West Africa Coast Initiative (WACI) Freetown Commitment on Combating Illicit Trafficking of Drugs and Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa, signed in February 2010.

63. Among the key reforms pursued by the Government is an overarching administration reform that includes the defence, security and justice sectors. Holistic Security Sector Reform continues to be pivotal, not only for these structural reforms, but also to contribute to stability and consolidate democratic governance and the establishment of sound civil-military relations under civilian rule. The construction of model police stations with the provision of equipment and the selection and training of police officers to staff the stations is an essential step in national efforts to restore State authority and re-establish public security conditions for the population, as well as to create a professional community-based police service. This will help break with past practice of frequent disregard for the rule of law and human rights. I encourage national authorities to speed up efforts towards the construction of the first model police station in Bissau, which would pave the way for the establishment of additional model police stations throughout the country.

64. I commend ECOWAS Heads of State and Government for their commitment to allocate $63 million for the implementation of the ECOWAS/CPLP Security Sector Reform road map. This constitutes a critical catalytic measure towards the full implementation of Security Sector Reform in the country, as international and regional partners now have allocated substantial funds to support the implementation of the comprehensive national SSR framework approved by national authorities in 2006. I also commend the Government of Angola for its generous concrete package of assistance, including the deployment of robust material and human resources to Guinea-Bissau, and the allocation of substantial financial assistance, capacity-building services and other support for the rehabilitation of military and police infrastructure. Additional commitments of support for the Security Sector Reform effort will be necessary to further harmonize and maximize external assistance to national authorities to help make these reforms succeed.

65. The priorities set out in the national Security Sector Reform plans and in the ECOWAS/CPLP road map constitute key building blocks to foster the reforms in the defence and security institutions, firstly through the retirement, reinsertion and reintegration initiatives, and a redeployment programme aimed at rejuvenating and professionalizing the military and security structures. I therefore welcome progress towards finalizing the process of establishing the pension fund, and appeal to international partners and national authorities to commit resources to help make the pension fund operational in the coming months. This fund will depend on international contributions for the first five years, after which the burden for supporting it will be transferred to the Government to be funded through national contributions envisaged as part of the public finance and public administration reforms. As the question of sustainability is a matter of concern for the international community, I urge the Government to initiate the process for planning the future transfer of responsibility for funding the pension fund from international partners to the Government. We also look forward to the Government's announcement of its

proposals regarding the long-awaited rejuvenation and professionalization of the armed forces, which would function under civilian authority and respect for the rule of law.

66. I call on national authorities, the African Union, ECOWAS, CPLP, relevant United Nations entities and bilateral partners to implement the recommendations of the joint assessment conducted by the United Nations, ECOWAS and CPLP, on the Security Sector Reform road map. The establishment of a joint task force or a coordination mechanism comprising representatives of ECOWAS, CPLP, the African Union, the European Union and the United Nations, to work with the Government in implementing the road map, is a matter of priority. I therefore exhort all partners to join forces and provide adequate technical and financial support for the effective functioning of the proposed mechanism.

67. I commend the deployment of two forensic experts by the Government of Brazil in support of ongoing investigations into the 2009 political assassinations in Guinea-Bissau. I also welcome Brazil's support for the rehabilitation of key police infrastructure. The assistance provided by the United States for the establishment of a programme to protect witnesses and special persons is also significant, as well as timely to speed up the process of finding justice for the 2009 assassinations. It is critical for national authorities to address in earnest the priorities set in Security Council resolution 1949 (2010) and to conclude independent and transparent investigations into the 2009 assassinations.

68. I urge the Government to remain focused on its public finance and public administration reforms, both of which will pave the way for increased national financial resources needed for investment in development and improved social services. The satisfactory performance of the Government in meeting benchmarks agreed with international financial institutions attests to its continuing commitment to public finance reforms. The finalization of Guinea-Bissau's Second Generation Poverty Reduction Strategy, which includes holistic security sector reform as a priority axis, will also clear the way for the Government to start a resource mobilization drive to finance the new strategy. I encourage the Government to engage with its development partners with a view to ensuring the implementation of this strategy, and I call upon international partners to assist national authorities in organizing the planned donor round table to secure appropriate funding.

69. I would like to conclude by commending the staff of UNIOGBIS, under the leadership of my Special Representative, Joseph Mutaboba, and the United Nations country team led by my Deputy Special Representative, as well as national and international non-governmental organizations and other partners, for their contribution to sustainable peace in Guinea-Bissau.

# Annex

## Excerpt from the UNIOGBIS strategic workplan and benchmarks

In December 2010, the Strategic Planning Group recommended that the outcome groups prepare a new format for a joint strategic workplan that should, in compliance with Security Council resolution 1949 (2010), define relevant benchmarks and indicators of progress. Afterwards, during the United Nations annual retreat held on 17 March 2011, the proposed benchmarks were endorsed by the United Nations family in Guinea-Bissau. It was also underlined that for the United Nations family to meet the expected results, it would be necessary to focus on Guinea-Bissau's main challenges, namely: (i) governance, democracy and political dialogue; (ii) economic growth and poverty reduction; (iii) social protection and human development; and (iv) security sector reform and the rule of law.

The United Nations joint vision or objective for Guinea-Bissau is a stable political, security, social and economic environment, conducive to peace consolidation and the full realization of human rights. The following key benchmarks and indicators of progress will be achieved through joint efforts by UNIOGBIS, the United Nations country team, national stakeholders and other international partners.

| *Security Council mandate* | *Key benchmarks* | *Indicators of progress* | *Timeline* |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Supporting an inclusive political dialogue and national reconciliation process*<br>*Assisting the Peacebuilding Commission in its work in addressing critical peacebuilding needs in Guinea-Bissau* | (1) State institutions maintain institutional and political stability and promote inclusive dialogue and national reconciliation | An inclusive national conference is held and follow-up mechanisms are established and functional | 2011-2012 |
| *Strengthening the capacities of national institutions in order to maintain constitutional order, public security and full respect for the rule of law*<br>*Providing strategic and technical support and assistance to the Government of Guinea-Bissau in developing and coordinating the implementation of security sector reform*<br>*Assisting the Peacebuilding Commission in its work in addressing critical peacebuilding needs in Guinea-Bissau* | (2) National institutions, including policing, internal security and criminal justice institutions, maintain constitutional order, good governance, public security and full respect for the rule of law and human rights throughout the country | Number of national stakeholders, including parliamentarians, whose capacities to undertake the constitutional review process are enhanced | 2011-2014 |
| | | The investigations into the 2009 political assassinations are concluded by the Office of the Prosecutor General | 2011 |
| | | Number of national stakeholders with enhanced leadership capacities and competences to develop and implement a long-term vision for the country | 2011-2012 |
| | | Witness protection programme is launched and operational | 2011-2016 |
| | | Peaceful and credible legislative, local and presidential elections are held | 2012-2014 |
| | | Reorganization process for police and internal security systems is launched and progresses | 2011-2016 |
| | | Perception by the population that there is increased public security and protection and respect for human rights, especially for vulnerable groups, through increased Model Police Stations throughout the country | 2011-2016 |
| | | Number of vetted/certified members of policing and internal security institutions | 2011-2012 |
| | | Identified number of vetted/certified members of police and security institutions are demobilized and socially reinserted | 2012-2014 |
| *Supporting the national efforts to curb the proliferation of small arms and light weapons* | | Obsolete small arms and light weapons are collected and destroyed, and ammunition safely stored | 2011-2012 |
| | | The National Commission on small arms and light weapons is functional | 2011-2012 |
| | | The National Mine Action Programme is implemented | 2011 |

| *Security Council mandate* | *Key benchmarks* | *Indicators of progress* | *Timeline* |
|---|---|---|---|
| *Strengthening the capacities of national institutions in order to maintain constitutional order, public security and full respect for the rule of law*<br><br>*Providing strategic and technical support and assistance to the Government of Guinea-Bissau in developing and coordinating the implementation of security sector reform*<br><br>*Assisting the Peacebuilding Commission in its work in addressing critical peacebuilding needs in Guinea-Bissau* | (3) Strengthened rule of law, defence, justice, police and law enforcement systems in Guinea-Bissau, in accordance with national holistic security sector reform, and enhanced national human rights capacity for the protection and promotion of respect for human rights | Improved capacities for policymaking, strategic planning and accountability in the criminal justice system | 2011-2012 |
| | | Improved judicial service delivery (courts and prosecution services) with decentralized legal aid and counselling, and a functioning national judicial training centre | 2011-2012 |
| | | Alternative dispute resolution mechanisms at community level are strengthened with an improved interface between traditional mechanisms and the formal justice sector | 2011-2016 |
| | | Improved cooperation among the various parts of the criminal justice system and due process specific laws are revised and implemented | 2011-2016 |
| | | Penitentiary services are strengthened and a corrections approach is launched | 2011-2014 |
| | | Continued support from international partners for the implementation of ongoing holistic security sector reform plans | 2011-2016 |
| | | Certification process for active personnel of the Armed Forces is launched | 2011-2014 |
| | | Increased number of resource mobilization activities to activate the Pension Fund and reintegration strategies | 2011-2016 |
| | | Demobilization and reinsertion process for national freedom fighters is launched and increased number of demobilized and reinserted former freedom fighters | 2011-2016 |
| | | Improved capacities of the Parliamentary Commission on Defence and Security to oversee the implementation of security sector reform | 2011-2012 |
| | | Increased public awareness on security sector reform | 2011-2016 |
| | (4) Enhanced cooperation and coordination on security sector reform matters with regional and international partners towards stabilization of Guinea-Bissau | Number of meetings of the National Security Sector Reform Steering Committee | 2011-2016 |
| | | Improved management capacity of the Security Sector Reform Permanent Secretariat | 2011-2016 |
| | | Portfolio of security sector reform projects produced and disseminated to partners | 2011-2012 |

| *Security Council mandate* | *Key benchmarks* | *Indicators of progress* | *Timeline* |
|---|---|---|---|
| | | National security sector reform strategies and plans are updated and harmonized | 2011-2012 |
| *Assisting national authorities to combat drug trafficking and organized crime, as well as human trafficking, especially child trafficking* | (5) National authorities combat drug and human trafficking (especially child trafficking), as well as organized crime more effectively | Increased institutional and human capacities to combat organized crime, drug trafficking and human and child trafficking | 2011-2016 |
| | | The 2011-2014 action plan of the Government to fight drug trafficking is operational and supported by the international community | 2011-2014 |
| *Providing strategic and technical support and assistance to the Government of Guinea-Bissau in developing and coordinating the implementation of security sector reform* | | Increased commitment of the Government of Guinea-Bissau to regional and international mechanisms and frameworks for fighting drug trafficking and organized crime, including G-8 initiatives and maritime patrols | 2011-2012 |
| | | Action plan to combat trafficking of minors is approved and launched | 2011-2012 |
| | | Returned trafficked children and children victims of violence receive appropriate care and are reintegrated into families and/or communities | 2011 |
| | | National child protection policy and action plan exist | 2012 |
| *Undertaking human rights promotion, protection and monitoring activities and supporting the institutionalization of respect for the rule of law* | (6) State institutions and civil society organizations guarantee the promotion and protection of human rights and gender equality | Improved technical capacity of civil society organizations to promote and protect human rights | 2011-2012 |
| | | Improved capacity of national human rights institutions on Paris Principles and other international human rights standards | 2011-2012 |
| and | | Mechanisms to monitor the human rights situation, including the implementation of universal periodic review recommendations, are established and functional | 2011-2012 |
| *Mainstreaming a gender perspective into peacebuilding, in line with Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008)* | | Draft national policy on gender equality and equity is finalized | 2011-2012 |
| | | Draft law on domestic violence is finalized | 2011 |
| | | A national policy on human rights and an action plan for its implementation are drafted and transmitted to the Government | 2011-2012 |
| | | Human rights and gender are mainstreamed into policy documents, national budget, national strategies and action plans | 2011-2012 |

| *Security Council mandate* | *Key benchmarks* | *Indicators of progress* | *Timeline* |
|---|---|---|---|
| | (7) A gender perspective is mainstreamed into the holistic security sector reform process in line with Security Council resolutions 1325 (2000) and 1820 (2008) | Increased number of women who play a role in the security and defence institutions | 2011-2016 |
| | | Number of women who contribute to security sector reform planning and implementation processes | 2011-2016 |
| | | Improved capacity of the national steering committee on the implementation of the National Action Plan on Security Council resolution 1325 (2000) | 2011-2016 |
| | | Security sector reform aspects of the national gender policy are promoted | 2011-2016 |
| *Assisting the Peacebuilding Commission in its work in addressing critical peacebuilding needs in Guinea-Bissau* | (8) The Guinea-Bissau Peacebuilding Strategic Framework and Priority Plan help address the country's youth and women employment needs | Increased number of youth and women who have access to credit | 2011-2012 |
| | | Increase in employment and income generating activities | 2011-2012 |
| *Enhancing cooperation with the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States, the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries, the European Union and other partners in their efforts to contribute to the stabilization of Guinea-Bissau*<br><br>*Helping in the mobilization of international assistance* | (9) Bilateral, regional and international partners remain engaged in support of Guinea-Bissau's stabilization efforts and the implementation of key reforms | The ECOWAS/CPLP road map is adopted and being implemented | 2011-2016 |
| | | Adequate strategic and operational support is provided for the implementation of the ECOWAS/CPLP road map | 2011-2012 |
| | | ECOWAS, CPLP, European Union, African Union, and bilateral partners step up technical and financial assistance to Government-led reforms in Guinea-Bissau | 2011-2012 |
| | | International round table for the mobilization of resources for the implementation of the Second Generation Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper is organized | 2011-2012 |
| | | Aid coordination mechanisms and policy are operational | 2011 |
| | | Economic reform programme agreed with IMF is implemented successfully | 2011 |
| | | Meetings of the International Contact Group on Guinea-Bissau and for the coordination of international assistance held | 2011-2016 |

United Nations S/2011/371

Security Council

Distr.: General
21 June 2011
English
Original: French

## Letter dated 16 June 2011 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to bring to your attention the communication annexed hereto dated 9 June 2011 from Mr. Yukiya Amano, Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), concerning implementation of the Safeguards Agreement between the Syrian Arab Republic and IAEA pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (see annex).

I would be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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## Annex

[Original: English]

I have the honour to refer to the implementation of the Safeguards Agreement between the Syrian Arab Republic and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) pursuant to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.

In paragraph 1 of its resolution GOV/2011/41, dated 9 June 2011 (see enclosure 1), the Board of Governors found the Syrian Arab Republic to be in non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with IAEA in the context of article XII.C of the IAEA Statute. In paragraph 3 of that resolution, the Board decided, inter alia, to report Syria's non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations. In the same paragraph, the Board also decided to provide to the Security Council all reports prepared by the Director General related to this issue (see enclosures 2 and 3).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and, as appropriate, its enclosures to the attention of all members of the Security Council and of the General Assembly.*

(*Signed*) Yukiya **Amano**

* In addition to the report of the Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (GOV/2011/30) reproduced herewith, reports GOV/2008/60, GOV/2009/9, GOV/2009/36, GOV/2009/56, GOV/2009/75, GOV/2010/11, GOV/2010/29, GOV/2010/47, GOV/2010/63 and GOV/2011/8 were also brought to the attention of the members of the Security Council. Those reports are available from www.iaea.org/.

**Enclosure 1**

# Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic

## Resolution adopted by the Board of Governors on 9 June 2011

The Board of Governors,

(a) Noting the Director General's May 24, 2011 report (GOV/2011/30) on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic, and previous reports by the Director General regarding Syria (GOV/2008/60, GOV/2009/9, GOV/2009/36, GOV/2009/56, GOV/2009/75, GOV/2010/11, GOV/2010/29, GOV/2010/47, GOV/2010/63, and GOV/2011/8),

(b) Recalling that Syria undertook to accept safeguards, in accordance with its comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (INFCIRC/407) concluded pursuant to Article III of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), on all source or special fissionable material in all peaceful nuclear activities within its territory, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere,

(c) Noting that the Director General in his latest report to the Board expressed regret that information concerning the Dair Alzour site was not provided to the Agency in a timely manner and that force was used before the Agency was given an opportunity to establish the facts in accordance with its responsibilities under Syria's Safeguards Agreement,

(d) Commending the Director General and the Secretariat for their professional and impartial efforts to implement the Safeguards Agreement in Syria and to resolve outstanding safeguards issues in Syria,

(e) Noting with serious concern that Syria's statements concerning the destroyed building at Dair Alzour are limited in detail, are not supported by documentation and have not allowed the Agency to confirm Syria's assertions regarding the non-nuclear nature of the building,

(f) Noting with serious concern Syria's lack of cooperation with the IAEA Director General's repeated requests for access to additional information and locations as well as Syria's refusal to engage substantively with the Agency on the nature of the Dair Alzour site since the Agency's June 2008 visit,

(g) Noting with serious concern the conclusion of the Agency that, notwithstanding the loss of information, and after considering Syria's response to allegations of an undeclared reactor and all relevant information available to the Agency, the building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site in September 2007 was very likely a nuclear reactor and should have been declared by Syria pursuant to Articles 41 and 42 of its Safeguards Agreement and Code 3.1 of the General Part of the Subsidiary Arrangements thereto,

(h) Mindful that the history of concealment of Syria's nuclear activities referred to in the Director General's reports, the nature of these activities, including the presence of a significant number of particles of anthropogenic natural uranium at the Dair Alzour site, procurement activities, and the resulting absence of confidence that Syria's nuclear program is exclusively for peaceful purposes, have given rise to concerns regarding the maintenance of international peace and security, and

(i) Noting that the Director General has repeatedly urged Syria to bring into force an Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement, which would further facilitate the Agency's work in verifying the correctness and completeness of Syria's declarations,

1. Finds, based on the report of the Director General, that Syria's undeclared construction of a nuclear reactor at Dair Alzour and failure to provide design information for the facility in accordance with Code 3.1 of Syria's Subsidiary Arrangements are a breach of Articles 41 and 42 of Syria's NPT Safeguards Agreement, and constitute non-compliance with its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency in the context of Article XII.C of the Agency's Statute;

2. Calls upon Syria to remedy urgently its non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement and fulfill its May 26 pledge to the Director General by responding positively and without delay to the Director General's requests for updated reporting from Syria under its Safeguards Agreement and access to all information, sites, material and persons necessary for the Agency to verify such reporting and resolve all outstanding questions so that the Agency can provide the necessary assurances as to the exclusively peaceful nature of Syria's nuclear program pursuant to Syria's Safeguards Agreement;

3. Decides to report, as provided for in Article XII.C of the Statute, through the Director General, Syria's non-compliance with its Safeguards Agreement to all Members of the Agency and to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations, to provide to the Security Council all reports prepared by the Director General related to the issue, and to make the text of this resolution as well as all previous reports on this issue available to the public;

4. Calls upon Syria to sign and promptly bring into force and implement in full the Additional Protocol and, pending that, to act in accordance with the Additional Protocol so that the Director General can provide the necessary assurances regarding both the correctness and completeness of Syria's declarations pursuant to its safeguards agreement;

5. Requests the Director General to continue his efforts to implement fully the Agency's safeguards agreement with Syria and to report any significant developments to the Board and to the Security Council of the United Nations, as appropriate; and

6. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

**Enclosure 2**

# Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic

*Report by the Director General*

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic[1] (Syria). It includes the Agency's assessment of the nature of the destroyed building at the Dair Alzour site.

## A. The Dair Alzour Site

2. On 2 June 2008, the Director General informed the Board of Governors that the Agency had been provided with information alleging that an installation at the Dair Alzour site in Syria, destroyed by Israel in September 2007, had been a nuclear reactor that was not yet operational and into which no nuclear material had been introduced. Information subsequently provided to the Agency further alleged that the reactor was a gas cooled graphite moderated reactor, that it was not configured to produce electricity, that it had been built with the assistance of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), and that there were three other locations in Syria that were functionally related to the Dair Alzour site. By the end of October 2007, large scale clearing and levelling operations had taken place at the site which had removed or obscured the remains of the destroyed building.[2] Syria has maintained, since May 2008, that the destroyed building was a non-nuclear military installation and that Syria had had no nuclear related cooperation with the DPRK.[3]

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[1] INFCIRC/407

[2] GOV/OR.1206, para. 26; GOV/2008/60, para. 16

[3] GOV/2008/60, para. 1; GOV/2009/36, para. 15

3. The Agency regrets that information concerning the Dair Alzour site was not provided to it in a timely manner and that force was used before the Agency was given an opportunity to establish the facts in accordance with its responsibilities under Syria's Safeguards Agreement.

4. In June 2008, during the Agency's visit to Syria, the Agency requested supporting documentation concerning the past and current use of the buildings at the Dair Alzour site and at three other locations allegedly functionally related to that site. The Agency also requested clarification about procurement activities by Syrian entities, including the Syrian Atomic Energy Agency (AECS), concerning pumping equipment, and large quantities of graphite and barite. During the visit, Syria stated that the function of the destroyed building was missile related. Syria also stated that the destroyed building could not have been a nuclear facility because of the unreliable and insufficient electricity supplies in the area, the limited availability of human resources in Syria and the unavailability of large quantities of treated water.

5. Environmental samples taken during the visit to the Dair Alzour site in June 2008 contained particles of anthropogenic natural uranium, graphite and stainless steel. Syria maintains that the particles of anthropogenic natural uranium found at the Dair Alzour site originated from the missiles used to destroy the building.[4] Syria also maintains that the pumping equipment and large quantities of graphite and barite that it sought to procure were for civilian and non-nuclear purposes.

6. Syria's statements — concerning the nature of the destroyed building, the Dair Alzour site, the three other locations allegedly functionally related to it, the procurement activities referred to above and the alleged foreign assistance — are limited in detail, are not supported by documentation and have not allowed the Agency to confirm Syria's assertions regarding the non-nuclear nature of the destroyed building. Since the Agency's visit to the Dair Alzour site in June 2008, the Agency has made repeated requests to Syria for:

- information concerning the Dair Alzour site, the infrastructure observed at the site and certain procurement efforts which Syria has stated were related to civilian non-nuclear activities;
- access to technical documentation and any other information related to the construction of the destroyed building;
- access to locations where the debris from the destroyed building, the remains of munitions, the debris from equipment and any salvaged equipment had been and/or are now situated; and
- further access to the Dair Alzour site and access to three other locations allegedly functionally related to the Dair Alzour site.

7. Syria has maintained that, due to the military and non-nuclear nature of the Dair Alzour site and three other locations allegedly functionally related to the Dair Alzour site, it has no obligation to provide more information under its Safeguards Agreement with the Agency.[5] The Agency has explained to Syria that there is no limitation in comprehensive safeguards agreements on Agency access to information, activities or locations simply because they may be military related. The Agency has repeatedly offered to establish the necessary modalities to enable Syria to substantiate its statements while protecting sensitive information related to its activities at the Dair Alzour site and the three other locations.

[4] GOV/2008/60, para. 8. In this context, it is noted that no additional information has been provided by Israel.

[5] GOV/2009/56, para. 9; GOV/2008/60, para. 14.

8. In a letter dated 18 November 2010, the Director General wrote to H.E. Walid Al-Moualem, Syria's Minister for Foreign Affairs, to request, inter alia, that Syria provide the Agency with prompt access to information and locations previously indicated by the Agency.

9. In a letter dated 6 February 2011 addressed to the Director General, Syria's Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that the Director General of the AECS would continue to work with the Agency to resolve all outstanding technical issues in accordance with Syria's commitments under the Agency's Statute, the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Syria's Safeguards Agreement.

10. Notwithstanding the Minister's statement referred to above, Syria has not engaged substantively with the Agency on the nature of the Dair Alzour site since the Agency's June 2008 visit and, since August 2009, has not responded to the other issues referred to in paragraph 6 above.

## B. Assessment of the Dair Alzour Site

11. As further described below, the Agency has assessed that:

- features of the destroyed building are comparable to those of gas cooled graphite moderated reactors of the type and size alleged;
- prior to the bombing, the configuration of the infrastructure at the site, including its connections for cooling and treated water, was able to support the operation of such a reactor and was not consistent with Syria's claims regarding the purpose of the infrastructure; in addition, a number of other features of the site add to its suitability for the construction and operation of a nuclear reactor;
- analysis of samples from the site indicates a connection to nuclear related activities; and
- the features of the destroyed building and the site could not have served the purpose claimed by Syria.

### B.1. Features of the Destroyed Building

12. The Agency has assessed that the dimensions, shape and configuration of the destroyed building are comparable to those found in reactors of the alleged type.

13. Based on commercial imagery from 2001 to 2007, the dimensions of the building[6] are comparable to those for nuclear reactors of the type and power alleged, i.e. similar to the 25 MW(th) gas cooled graphite moderated reactor at Yongbyon[7] in the DPRK. The Agency's analysis of a photograph of the bombed building that was provided to the Agency by a Member State corroborates the allegation that Syria attempted to conceal the features of the building's configuration by the addition of wall and roof sections.

14. Analysis of imagery provided by two Member States, taken shortly after the building was destroyed, indicates that internal features of the building correspond to a large central hall, a

[6] The assessment of the dimensions of the destroyed building takes into account the considerable portion of the building that was constructed below ground level.

[7] Officially referred to as the 5 MW(e) Experimental Nuclear Power Plant Number 1.

cylindrical biological shield, a containment structure, heat exchanger shielding structures and a spent fuel pond; all of which would be required for a reactor.[8] The Agency procured a radar image of the building taken shortly after its destruction. Within the limits of the resolution, the image is consistent with those provided to the Agency by the two Member States.

15. The imagery of the destroyed building showed that the feature interpreted as being a containment structure had similar dimensions, shape and layout to other known reactors of the type alleged, and the overall size of the building was sufficient to house the equipment needed for such a nuclear reactor. Photographs of a reactor vessel at the Dair Alzour site released by a Member State simultaneously with the publication of the allegations are not inconsistent with the Agency's assessment of the dimensions of the containment structure. Based on all the information available to the Agency, including the Agency's analysis of these photographs, it is estimated that the reactor core had 843 fuel channels and 79 access ports, and, depending on the heat transfer characteristics of the fuel, the reactor may have had a thermal power of 25 MW or higher.

16. During the June 2008 Agency visit, Syria stated that some equipment which remained functional after the bombing had been removed from the destroyed building. Satellite imagery provided by a Member State confirms Syria's efforts to recover equipment and material from the destroyed building prior to its complete demolition and burial. The efforts included the covering of areas of the destroyed building which may have served to conceal features of the facility during the process. A significant fraction of material and equipment had been removed from the site before the remainder was demolished and buried in the seven weeks following the bombing.

## B.2. Site Infrastructure and Site Suitability

17. Based on satellite imagery and the Agency's observations made during the June 2008 visit, the Agency has assessed that the configuration and capacity of the infrastructure at the site prior to the destruction of the building were consistent with the cooling requirements of a 25 MW(th) nuclear reactor. Syria claims that the pumps at the river pump house (RPH) and the Dair Alzour site pump house (SPH) comprised a staged pumping system to supply river water to the civilian water treatment facility (WTF) located approximately 5 km to the east of the Dair Alzour site. Syria's claims in this respect are not supported by the Agency's assessment (see Figure 1 below). Factors considered in the Agency's assessment include:

- Before the destruction of the building, the river water pumping system had the necessary pipes to supply the building with river water. A pipe ran from the building to a point downstream from the RPH. This configuration was consistent with the supply of cooling water to a reactor and the return of water to the river;
- The observed pumping capacity was adequate for cooling 25 MW of thermal power. Additionally, the stated function of the destroyed building (i.e. missile related) would not require connection to the observed river water pumping capacity;
- Before the destruction of the building, the river water pumping system's output was not connected to the WTF; and

[8] The Agency notes that there is a variety in the configuration of known examples of this type of reactor, some with partial underground construction, cooling without cooling towers, different core sizes and different placement of spent fuel ponds. The configuration of the destroyed building falls within this variety of configurations.

- After the destruction of the building, Syria reconfigured the pumping infrastructure to remove sections of the return pipe and to install a new large diameter water pipe connection from the SPH to the WTF




**Figure 1.** Key infrastructure configurations before bombing and after reconfiguration (not to scale)

18. In contrast to Syria's statements concerning insufficient electricity supplies in the area, the site infrastructure included buried high voltage power distribution and transformer equipment. At the time of the Agency's June 2008 visit, the Agency observed electrical infrastructure and the operation of all the river water pumps at the RPH and SPH. The combined electrical load of the pumps represents a significant fraction of the total electrical power requirement for operation of a reactor of the alleged type. Therefore, the Agency has assessed that the electrical infrastructure at the site was possibly sufficient to meet the needs of such a nuclear reactor.

19. Based on the available information, including 1994 AECS seismology data centred on the Dair Alzour site and 2002 geology data concerning the Dair Alzour region, the site has a number of other features which add to its suitability for the construction and operation of a nuclear reactor. These features of the site include a relatively stable geological platform on which to construct a heavy building, low population density in the area, close proximity to a river for the supply of cooling water, and the availability of services, including treated water and electricity. Such features are normally considered in the site selection process for a nuclear reactor.[9]

## B.3. Sampling

20. Assessments of samples taken from the Dair Alzour site indicate a connection to nuclear related activities and the presence of materials that could possibly be used in the construction of gas cooled reactors.

21. The presence of a significant number of particles of anthropogenic natural uranium at the Dair Alzour site indicates a connection to nuclear related activities at the site and increases concerns about possible undeclared nuclear material at the site. The Agency has not been able to determine the origin of the particles. Notwithstanding the lack of response to the Agency's requests for additional information concerning the origin of the particles, the Agency's assessment of Syria's explanation for the presence of the particles is that, based on their morphology and distribution, there is a low probability that they could have originated from the munitions used to destroy the building or by aerial dispersion as suggested by Syria.

22. The Agency has examined the samples retrieved from the Dair Alzour site during the June 2008 visit for indications of the presence of construction materials associated with a gas cooled graphite moderated reactor. The results showed the presence of graphite and stainless steel. The graphite particles were too small to permit an analysis of the purity compared to that normally required for use in a reactor. The types of stainless steel detected at the site were compatible with nuclear use, but not exclusively so.

## B.4. Stated Function of the Dair Alzour Site

23. The Agency's assessment of the features observed at the Dair Alzour site prior to the building's bombing and immediately thereafter is that it is unlikely that the purpose of the site was missile assembly, storage or launching. Factors considered in the Agency's assessment included the building's configuration, the construction materials, suitability of openings and hatches for missile handling or launching, the assessment of the water infrastructure described in paragraph 17 above, Syria's declaration of the civilian nature of the water infrastructure on the site and normal missile handling practices.

## B.5. Assessment Summary

24. The circumstances relating to the Dair Alzour site are unique, in that the building on the site has been destroyed, the debris from the site has been cleared, several years have now passed, and Syria has not provided the necessary cooperation required by the Agency, as detailed in this report and previous reports. Notwithstanding the loss of substantial information, after considering the initial allegations and Syria's responses thereto, and considering all information available to the Agency, the Agency

[9] IAEA Safety Standards Series, No. NS-R-3, "Site Evaluation for Nuclear Installations"; IAEA Nuclear Energy Series, No. NG-G-3.1, "Milestones in the Development of a National Infrastructure for Nuclear Power".

concludes that the destroyed building was very likely a nuclear reactor[10] and should have been declared by Syria pursuant to Articles 42 and 43 of its Safeguards Agreement and Code 3.1 of the General Part of the Subsidiary Arrangements thereto.

## C. Other Activities and Locations Possibly Related to the Dair Alzour Site

25. The Agency does not have sufficient information to provide any assessment concerning the function or operational status of the three other locations that are alleged to be functionally related to the Dair Alzour site.

26. Large quantities of barite were purchased by the AECS between 2002 and 2006. Syria has stated that the material was to be used for shielded radiation therapy rooms at hospitals, without providing any supporting information.[11] However, the end use of the barite as stated in the actual shipping documentation indicates that the material was intended for acid filtration. Additionally, the delivery of the barite was stopped at the request of the AECS after the destruction of the building at the Dair Alzour site and the remaining quantity was left undelivered. Given that barite is frequently used to improve radiation shielding properties of concrete, and the inconsistency concerning the end use of the barite and the involvement of the AECS in its procurement, the Agency cannot exclude the possibility that barite may have been intended for use in the construction of shielded spaces for purposes linked to nuclear fuel cycle related facilities.

## D. Activities at Other Locations in Syria

27. As previously reported, particles of anthropogenic uranium of a type not included in Syria's reported inventory were found at the Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR) in 2008 and in 2009. Syria's initial explanations in June 2009 that the particles had originated either from standard reference materials used in neutron activation analysis or from a shielded transport container were not supported by the results of sampling carried out by the Agency.[12] During the November 2009 inspection, and contrary to its earlier statements, Syria explained that the anthropogenic particles had originated from previously unreported activities performed at the MNSR related to the preparation of tens of grams of uranyl nitrate using yellowcake produced at Homs.[13] At the March 2010 physical

[10] Since the early years of implementation of comprehensive safeguards by the Agency, it has been recognized that securing absolute proof of compliance (or otherwise) of a State with the terms of its Safeguards Agreement is not possible, and that "reasonable" inferences must be drawn in making conclusions, taking into account all the available information (GOV/2107, para. 3(2); GOV/2863, paras 31 and 32).

[11] GOV/2009/36, para. 14; GOV/2009/56, para. 5.

[12] GOV/2009/75, para. 6.

[13] A pilot plant for the purification of phosphoric acid was constructed and commissioned in 1997 at Homs, Syria, with the support of the United Nations Development Programme and the IAEA. Yellowcake was also produced as a result of the acid purification process. During a July 2004 visit to the Homs phosphoric acid purification plant, Agency inspectors observed some hundreds of kilograms of yellowcake.

inventory verification (PIV), another small quantity of undeclared uranyl nitrate was identified by the Agency at the MNSR. Syria explained that the unreported activities had taken place in a different location in the MNSR than previously declared to the Agency.[14] As reported earlier, Syria submitted inventory change reports in June 2010 for the newly declared material shown to the Agency during the PIV. However, inconsistencies between Syria's declarations and the Agency's findings remained unresolved at that stage.

28. As previously reported, during a meeting on 3 September 2010 to resolve the inconsistencies, agreement was reached with Syria on a plan of action which included, inter alia, actions related to the amounts and use of nuclear material at the MNSR, scientific publications concerning uranium conversion experiments different from those declared by Syria to have occurred at the MNSR, indications of nuclear material under the control of the Waste Management Department of the AECS, and the Agency's requests for access to Homs. Syria's initial response to the plan of action did not provide the necessary clarifications.[15]

29. On 8 March 2011, the arrangements for a visit to Homs by the Agency on 1 April 2011 were finalized. The Agency visited the Phosphoric Acid Pilot Plant and associated locations on that date and performed all of its planned sampling and other activities. The Agency took environmental samples from specified locations and destructive analysis samples from specific batches of the yellowcake by-product of the phosphoric acid purification. The AECS provided some documentation requested by the Agency and made arrangements for relevant research staff to be present for the discussion of the uranium conversion experiments indicated in paragraph 28 above.

30. Analytical results from the samples taken during the visit to Homs are not inconsistent with Syria's statements concerning the origin of the uranyl nitrate prepared during experiments at the MNSR and the origin of the anthropogenic natural uranium particles found at the MNSR.

31. On 19 April 2011, the Agency carried out a PIV at the MNSR where routine verification activities were performed, including the verification of previously undeclared waste material.[16]

32. Based on the information provided by Syria, and the results of the Agency's verification activities, the Agency has concluded that Syria's statements concerning the origin of the anthropogenic uranium particles found at the MNSR are not inconsistent with the Agency's findings. Therefore, the matter will be addressed in the routine implementation of safeguards.

## E. Conclusion

33. The Agency regrets that Syria has not cooperated since June 2008 in connection with the unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and the three other locations allegedly functionally related to it. Based on all the information available to the Agency and its technical evaluation of that information, the Agency assesses that it is very likely that the building destroyed at the Dair Alzour site was a nuclear reactor which should have been declared to the Agency. Concerning the three other

[14] GOV/2010/47, para. 10.

[15] GOV/2010/63, paras 10, 11 and 12.

[16] GOV/2010/63, para. 12.

locations, the Agency is unable to provide any assessment concerning their nature or operational status.

34. Concerning the MNSR, Syria has cooperated with the Agency by providing the requested access to Homs. Syria's statements concerning the previously unreported conversion activities at the MNSR and origin of the anthropogenic uranium particles found at the MNSR are not inconsistent with the results of the Agency's verification activities. The matter will be addressed in the routine implementation of safeguards

**Enclosure 3**

# Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in the Syrian Arab Republic

*Report by the Director General*

In paragraph 24, replace "Articles 42 and 43" with "Articles 41 and 42".

United Nations S/2011/372

# Security Council

Distr.: General
17 June 2011

Original: English

## Letter dated 16 June 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

I have the honour to refer to the 18 and 19 March 2011 notifications of the United States of America to you regarding measures authorized by paragraphs 4 and 8 of Security Council resolution 1973 (2011) (S/2011/152 and S/2011/156).

In accordance with paragraph 4 of resolution 1973 (2011), I would like to inform you that the United States is taking further measures pursuant to the authorizations contained in that paragraph. In this connection, I would like to inform you of the provision of non-lethal supplies and equipment to Libyan groups such as the Transitional National Council in support of efforts to protect civilians and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in Libya.

I would be grateful if you would circulate the present letter as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Susan E. **Rice**

11-37887 (E) 170611

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United Nations S/2011/373

Security Council

Distr.: General
20 June 2011

Original: English

# Thirty-first report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 14 of resolution 1284 (1999)

## I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999) and covers the developments since 11 December 2010, following the issuance of the thirtieth report (S/2010/635) on 10 December 2010. It provides an update on the issue of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals and that of missing Kuwaiti property, including national archives.

2. The adoption of Security Council resolutions 1956 (2010), 1957 (2010) and 1958 (2010) in December 2010 lifted several major Chapter VII mandates on Iraq. This mainly left Iraq's obligations to Kuwait still outstanding, including with respect to the files of missing persons and property. The formation of the new Government of Iraq at the end of 2010 provided a hopeful opportunity for the resolution of the remaining problems between the two countries.

## II. Recent activities with regard to the repatriation and return of all Kuwaiti and third-country nationals or their remains

3. Throughout the reporting period, the High-level Coordinator, Ambassador Gennady Tarasov, focused his activities on the task of building confidence and cooperation between Kuwait and Iraq with a view to strengthening their practical engagement in the search for missing persons and property and encouraging them to achieve visible and significant progress towards the implementation of the objectives of paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999).

4. The recent high-level Iraqi-Kuwaiti exchange of visits provided a positive environment for the Coordinator's contacts with the representatives of Iraq and Kuwait as well as with the other members of the Tripartite Commission and its Technical Subcommittee, which remains the primary body for dealing with the issue of persons unaccounted for from the 1990-1991 Gulf War. Given the prevailing spirit of commitment in the Tripartite Commission and the Technical Subcommittee, Ambassador Tarasov consistently called for further efforts in the search for missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals in Iraq in order to achieve tangible progress on the ground. A priority at this stage was to assist and facilitate the setting up of an effective mechanism within the framework of the Technical Subcommittee to



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conduct regular exploratory missions to sites on Iraqi territory where Kuwaiti and third-country victims may have been buried. Such a mechanism is necessary to fully probe the fate of the missing persons.

5. The Coordinator made three visits to the region (in February, April and May) that coincided with the meetings of the Technical Subcommittee and Tripartite Commission. On 9 February 2011, he was received by the Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Kuwait, Sheikh Mohammed Al-Sabah Al-Salem Al-Sabah, who indicated that the emerging spirit of cooperation between Iraq and Kuwait needed to be translated into practical and result-oriented steps towards the resolution of the outstanding issues, including the files of the missing persons and property. The Deputy Prime Minister stressed that Kuwait would like to work with Iraq to speed up its compliance with the relevant Security Council resolutions.

6. On 14 April 2011, the Coordinator met with the Under-Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Kuwait, Khaled Al Jarallah. The latter noted that the task of finding the mortal remains of the Kuwaiti victims should not be "mixed" with the developments in political relations between Iraq and Kuwait. He reaffirmed his support for the efforts of the Coordinator and the continuation of his work. This was echoed by the Acting Chairman of the Kuwaiti National Committee for Missing Persons and Prisoner of War Affairs. The Kuwaiti officials appreciated the role played by the United Nations and the Security Council in pursuing this humanitarian issue.

7. On 22 and 23 May 2011, Ambassador Tarasov travelled to Iraq and met with the Minister for Human Rights, Mohammed S. Al-Sudaney, and other officials. The Minister underscored the commitment of his Government to meet its obligations with regard to the issue of the Kuwaiti and third-country nationals, and briefed the Coordinator on the activities of his Ministry. He noted that the high-level consultative meeting of the members of the Tripartite Commission held on 18 May 2011 in Baghdad for the first time in many years demonstrated the determination of all participants to attain speedy progress. Kuwait had provided a grant of $974,000 to help build Iraq's capacity in mass-grave excavations and identification of missing persons. He reiterated that Iraq would cooperate with the efforts of the Coordinator to achieve the objectives of his mandate.

8. After the successful realization of the first joint exploratory mission within the framework of the Technical Subcommittee, which visited Nassiriyah, Southern Iraq, in December 2010, the Coordinator was informed that a similar mission was planned for a site near Khamisiyah suspected to contain the remains of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals. Following the clearing operation at the site recently undertaken by the Iraqi specialized team, the Technical Subcommittee, in its meeting on 8 June 2011, decided to carry out this new mission before the end of June 2011, making it the second such endeavour in six months. There seemed to be a broad consensus among all concerned that such missions, under the aegis of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and with the strong support of the members of the Technical Subcommittee, might present a suitable format for further work on the ground. In the view of the Coordinator, shared by his interlocutors, it could become the focus of an effective functional mechanism that would set clear benchmarks for achieving progress in the search for missing persons, referred to in my comprehensive report (S/2009/190, para. 16).

9. While in Kuwait in May 2011, Ambassador Tarasov met with the families of missing persons to brief them on the current status of efforts to clarify the fate of their relatives and loved ones.

10. On 26 April 2011, the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations forwarded a letter to the Coordinator from the Deputy Chairman of the Kuwaiti National Committee for Missing Persons and Prisoner of War Affairs, which summarizes the information on the Kuwaiti and third-country nationals whose remains were found in Iraq (see annex).

11. In a related development, a team of experts and forensic specialists from ICRC, Iraq, Kuwait, the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland carried out a joint field exhumation on 5 and 6 June 2011 along "Highway 80" in Kuwait. Thirty-two sets of remains, presumably of Iraqi military personnel, some of them with identification tags, were discovered. They will be handed over to the Iraqi authorities once the necessary procedures have been completed. Together with the return by Kuwait of the remains of 55 Iraqi soldiers in 2010, this illustrates the effectiveness of sustained professional efforts in finding missing people despite the passage of years.

## III. Recent activities with regard to the return of Kuwaiti property

12. I remain concerned that no progress has been made in the search for the Kuwaiti national archives, and that no credible information about their whereabouts has emerged.

13. On 23 November 2010, the Prime Minister of Iraq supported the suggestion of the Coordinator to set up an inter-ministerial committee, which would lead and coordinate efforts with regard to the missing Kuwaiti archives and other properties.

14. During his most recent visit to Baghdad, the Coordinator urged the Government of Iraq to set up such an official body at the earliest opportunity to exert credible efforts to find the archives, to which Kuwait attaches particular importance. This would further demonstrate Iraq's determination to resolve this matter of concern to Kuwait.

## IV. Observations

15. I believe that the current efforts in the search for missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals are gradually moving forward. I encourage the Government of Iraq to expeditiously take further practical steps towards fulfilling its obligations under paragraph 14 of Security Council resolution 1284 (1999). The assurances of the Government of Iraq in this regard are noted. I look forward to being able to report positively to the Security Council at the earliest opportunity on the concrete efforts made by the Government of Iraq in the implementation of this resolution. I value the continued constructive and proactive approach of the Government of Kuwait in this regard.

16. It appears that the emerging pattern of joint exploratory/excavation missions in the framework of the Technical Subcommittee is a promising approach for

expediting practical progress on the ground. I welcome and commend the role played by ICRC and the members of the Technical Subcommittee in this process. The continued support of the international community and the Security Council remains essential for successful realization of the mandated tasks.

17. I believe that the task of discovering the fate of missing Kuwaiti and third-country nationals is urgent and should not be influenced by political factors and considerations. For this reason, the humanitarian mandate must be insulated as much as possible from wider regional developments to ensure its effective implementation.

18. Now that the organizational and logistical aspects of the search for the missing persons appear to be in place, the goal of finding and identifying the victims and finally closing their cases is an imperative. Visible and tangible progress in this respect, together with other necessary steps on the part of Iraq to fulfil its obligations towards Kuwait under the relevant Security Council resolutions, should create a positive momentum and enable the Council to take up my report of 27 July 2009 pursuant to paragraph 5 of resolution 1859 (2008) (S/2009/385).

19. I support the High-level Coordinator's recommendation that an effective national mechanism be set up by the Government of Iraq to lead and coordinate efforts to clarify the fate of the Kuwaiti national archives and other properties and report the results to the United Nations.

20. I recommend that the Security Council extend the financing of the Coordinator's mandate until December 2011 in order to continue to build on the current momentum towards the implementation of paragraph 14 of resolution 1284 (1999).

## Annex

### Letter dated 26 April 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the High-level Coordinator

I have the honour to enclose herewith a message from His Excellency Dr. Ibrahim Majed Al-Shaheen, Deputy Chairman of the Kuwaiti National Committee for Missing Persons and Prisoner of War Affairs addressed to you (see enclosure), along with an unofficial translation.

(*Signed*) Mansour **Alotaibi**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

## Enclosure

[Original: Arabic]

### National Committee for Missing Persons and Prisoner of War Affairs

No.: 6/RL/2011

Date: 18 April 2011

Mr. Gennady Tarasov
High-level Coordinator

I have the honour to refer to the meeting with you that took place on 13 April 2011 at the headquarters of the National Committee for Missing Persons and Prisoner of War Affairs, at which you were advised of the outcome of the 69th meeting of the Technical Subcommittee of the Tripartite Commission.

I should like to update you on the retrieval of remains from Iraqi territory in 2003 and 2004. Those remains include all those that were exhumed in Iraqi territory by technical teams from the State of Kuwait in the presence of representatives of the Interim Government. No further remains have since been retrieved. In light of genetic testing and identification conducted by the competent Kuwaiti authorities, and taking into account that some remains were returned to the Iraqi side after Kuwait had prepared a genetic profile of each set, the search continues in Iraq for the burial sites of 350 prisoners. The findings may be summarized as follows:

I. From the Karbala 1 and 2 burial sites, 51 sets of remains retrieved; 48 were identified and 3 were returned (see table 1).

II. From the Amarah burial site, 37 sets of remains retrieved; 34 were identified and 3 were returned (see table 2).

III. From the Karbala 4 burial site, 47 sets of remains retrieved; 34 were identified, 11 were returned and 2 were merged (see table 3).

IV. From the Ramadi burial site, 32 sets of remains retrieved; 24 were identified, 2 were returned and 6 were merged (see table 4).

V. From the Samawah, Habbaniyah and Ramadi burial sites, 142 sets of remains retrieved; 92 were identified, 19 were returned, 27 were merged and 4 were consumed in testing (see table 5).

VI. From the Sakran and Najaf burial sites, 8 sets of remains retrieved; 5 were returned and 3 were consumed in testing (see table 6).

Accordingly, 317 sets of remains have been retrieved from Iraqi territory. The remains of 232 Kuwaiti prisoners of war found in Iraqi territory have been identified (four other prisoners have been identified at the Sabhan burial site in Kuwait).

Forty-three sets of remains have been returned to the Iraqi authorities with their genetic information, 35 sets of remains were merged, and 7 were consumed in testing, as indicated in table 7. Consequently, none of the remains that were retrieved from Iraqi territory are in the hands of the Kuwaiti authorities.

For information.

(*Signed*) Ibrahim Majed **Al-Shaheen**
Acting Chairman of the Committee

Table 1
**Karbala 1 and 2 burial sites**

| *Burial site* | *Number* | *Matches* | *Turned over to Red Cross* | *Merged* | *Consumed in testing* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Karbala 1 + 2 | 15 | 48 sets of remains | 3 sets of remains | — | — |
| 30/9-6/10/2003 | 30001-30010<br>30201-30205 | 30001, 30002<br>30003, 30004<br>30005, 30006 | 30014, 30208, 30218 | | |
| 9/2-15/2/2004 | 36<br>30011-30022<br>30206-30229 | 30007, 30008<br>30009, 30010<br>30011, 30012<br>30013, 30015<br>30016, 30017<br>30018, 30019<br>30020, 30021<br>30022<br>30201, 30202<br>30203, 30204<br>30205, 30206<br>30207, 30209<br>30210, 30211<br>30212, 30213<br>30214, 30215<br>30216, 30217<br>30219, 30220<br>30221, 30222<br>30223, 30224<br>30225, 30226<br>30227, 30228<br>30229 | | | |
| **Total** | **51 sets of remains** | **48 sets of remains** | **3 sets of remains** | — | — |

Table 2
**Amarah burial site**

| *Burial site* | *Number* | *Matches* | *Turned over to Red Cross* | *Merged* | *Consumed in testing* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Amarah<br>23/3/2004 | 20 | 34 sets of remains | 3 sets of remains | — | — |
| | 6100-6109 | 6100 | 6117, 6126, | | |
| | 6110-6119 | 6101, 6102 | 6105 | | |
| | | 6103, 6104 | | | |
| 24/3/2004 | 17 | 6106, 6107 | | | |
| | | 6108, 6109 | | | |
| | 6120-6128 | 6110, 6111 | | | |
| | 6129-6136 | 6112, 6113 | | | |
| | | 6114, 6115 | | | |
| | | 6116, 6118 | | | |
| | | 6119, 6120 | | | |
| | | 6121, 6122 | | | |
| | | 6123, 6124 | | | |
| | | 6125, 6127 | | | |
| | | 6128, 6129 | | | |
| | | 6130, 6131 | | | |
| | | 6132, 6133 | | | |
| | | 6134, 6135 | | | |
| | | 6136 | | | |
| **Total** | **37 sets of remains** | **34 sets of remains** | **3 sets of remains** | — | — |

Table 3
**Karbala 4 burial site**

| *Burial site* | *Number* | *Matches* | *Turned over to Red Cross* | *Merged* | *Consumed in testing* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Karbala 4<br>17-19/7/2004 | 12 sets of remains | 34 sets of remains | 11 sets of remains | 2 sets of remains | — |
| | 30301-30312 | 30301, 30303 | 30322, 30324, 30327, 30329, 30331, 30333, 30334, 30339, 30343, 30346, 30347 | 30302 with 30306 | |
| | | 30304, 30305 | | 30323 with 30322 | |
| | | 30306, 30307 | | | |
| | 24 sets of remains | 30308, 30309 | | | |
| | | 30310, 30311 | | | |
| | 30313-30336 | 30312, 30313 | | | |
| | | 30314, 30315 | | | |
| | | 30316, 30317 | | | |
| | 11 sets of remains | 30318, 30319 | | | |
| | | 30320, 30321 | | | |
| | 30337-30347 | 30325, 30326 | | | |
| | | 30328, 30330 | | | |
| | | 30332, 30335 | | | |
| | | 30336, 30337 | | | |
| | | 30338, 30340 | | | |
| | | 30341, 30342 | | | |
| | | 30344, 30345 | | | |
| **Total** | **47 sets of remains** | **34 sets of remains** | **11 sets of remains** | **2 sets of remains** | — |

Table 4
**Ramadi 4 burial site**

| *Burial site* | *Number* | *Matches* | *Turned over to Red Cross* | *Merged* | *Consumed in testing* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Ramadi | 32 sets of remains | 24 sets of remains | 2 sets of remains | 6 sets of remains | — |
| | | 7102, 7104 | | | |
| 27-28-29/7/2004 | 7101-7132 | 7105, 7106 | 7110-7126 | 7101 with 7109 | |
| | | 7108, 7109 | | 7103 with 7004 | |
| | | 7111, 7112 | | 7107 with 7004 | |
| | | 7114, 7115 | | 7113 with 7002 | |
| | | 7116, 7117 | | 7123 with 7122 | |
| | | 7118, 7119 | | 7132 with 7131 | |
| | | 7120, 7121 | | | |
| | | 7122, 7124 | | | |
| | | 7125, 7127 | | | |
| | | 7128, 7129 | | | |
| | | 7130, 7131 | | | |
| **Total** | **32 sets of remains** | **24 sets of remains** | **2 sets of remains** | **6 sets of remains** | — |

Table 5
**Samawah, Habbaniyah and Ramadi burial sites**

| *Burial site* | *Number* | *Matches* | *Turned over to Red Cross* | *Merged* | *Consumed in testing* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Habbaniyah | 8 sets of remains<br><br>5001-5006<br>5011-5012 | — | 6 sets of remains<br><br>5002, 5003, 5004, 5006, 5011, 5012 | — | 2 sets of remains<br><br>5005, 5001 |
| Samawah: 1st examination | 8 sets of remains<br><br>3001-3008 | 6 sets of remains<br><br>3001, 3003,<br>3005, 3006,<br>3007, 3008, | 1 set of remains<br><br>3004 | 1 set of remains<br><br>3001 with 3002 | — |
| Samawah: 2nd examination | 48 sets of remains<br><br>2001-2048 | 33 sets of remains<br><br>2002, 2003<br>2006, 2007<br>2008, 2009<br>2011, 2012<br>2013, 2014<br>2015, 2016<br>2017, 2018<br>2019, 2020<br>2022, 2023<br>2024, 2025<br>2028, 2029<br>2031, 2032<br>2035, 2036<br>2037, 2039<br>2040, 2041<br>2042, 2044<br>2046 | 6 sets of remains<br><br>2005, 2010, 2021, 2026, 2047, 2038 | 9 sets of remains<br><br>2001 with 2019<br>2027 with 2022<br>2030 with 2032<br>2004 with 2002<br>2033 with 2047<br>2034 with 2039<br>2043 with 2037<br>2045 with 2039<br>2048 with 2040 | — |
| Samawah: 3rd examination | 40 sets of remains<br><br>4001-4025<br>4029-4042<br>4046 | 22 sets of remains<br><br>4001, 4004<br>4006, 4008<br>4009, 4011<br>4012, 4016<br>4018, 4019<br>4020, 4021<br>4023, 4024 | 3 sets of remains<br><br>4005, 4014, 4039 | 13 sets of remains<br><br>4002 with 4040<br>4003 with 4046<br>4007 with 4008<br>4010 with 4011<br>4015 with 4008<br>4017 with 4011<br>4035 with 4030 | 2 sets of remains<br><br>4013<br>4022 |

| *Burial site* | *Number* | *Matches* | *Turned over to Red Cross* | *Merged* | *Consumed in testing* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | | 4025, 4030<br>4031, 4032<br>4033, 4034<br>4040, 4046 | | 4036 with 4032<br>4037 with 4021<br>4038 with 4016<br>4041 with 4001<br>4042 with 4032<br>4029 with 4004 | |
| Samawah: 4th examination | 32 sets of remains<br><br>8000-8031 | 28 sets of remains<br><br>8000, 8001<br>8002, 8003<br>8004, 8005<br>8006, 8007<br>8008, 8009<br>8010, 8011<br>8012, 8013<br>8014, 8015<br>8017, 8018<br>8020, 8021<br>8023, 8024<br>8025, 8026<br>8027, 8028<br>8029, 8030 | 2 sets of remains<br><br>8019, 8016 | 2 sets of remains<br><br>8022 with 8020<br>8031 with 8014 | — |
| Ramadi | 1 set of remains<br><br>6001 | — | 1 set of remains<br><br>6001 | — | — |
| Ramadi (Abu Dhabi television) | 5 sets of remains<br><br>7001-7005 | 3 sets of remains<br><br>7002, 7004, 7005 | — | 2 sets of remains<br><br>7001, 7003 | — |
| **Total** | **142 sets of remains** | **92 sets of remains** | **19 sets of remains** | **27 sets of remains** | **4 sets of remains** |

Table 6
**Sakran and Najaf sites**

| *Burial site* | *Number* | *Matches* | *Turned over to Red Cross* | *Merged* | *Consumed in testing* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Sakran<br>22/6/2003 | 3 sets of remains<br><br>7011-7013 | — | 3 sets of remains<br><br>7011-7013 | — | — |
| Najaf<br>15/2/2004 | 5 sets of remains<br><br>9001-9005 | — | 2 sets of remains<br><br>9001, 9004 | — | 3 sets of remains<br><br>9002, 9003, 9005 |
| **Total** | **8 sets of remains** | — | **5 sets of remains** | — | **3 sets of remains** |

Table 7

| | *Burial site* | *Number* | *Matches* | *Turned over to the Red Cross* | *Merged* | *Consumed in testing* |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Karbala 1 +2 | 51 | 48 | 3 | — | — |
| 2 | Amarah | 37 | 34 | 3 | — | — |
| 3 | Karbala 4 | 47 | 34 | 11 | 2 | — |
| 4 | Ramadi | 32 | 24 | 2 | 6 | — |
| 5 | Samawah, Habbaniyah and Ramadi | 142 | 92 | 19 | 27 | 4 |
| 6 | Sakran and Najaf | 8 | | 5 | — | 3 |
| **Total** | | **317** | **232** | **43** | **35** | **7** |

United Nations A/65/870–S/2011/374

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
22 June 2011

Original: English

**General Assembly**
**Sixty-fifth session**
Agenda item 34
**Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development**

**Security Council**
**Sixty-sixth year**

## Identical letters dated 17 June 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia regarding the Russian occupation troops' recent attack on the local population of a village in the Gali District (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the sixty-fifth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Alexander **Lomaia**
Permanent Representative

11-38347 (E) 230611

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## Annex to the identical letters dated 17 June 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

## Statement of the Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarding the Russian occupation troops' recent attack on the local population of a village in the Gali District

On 10 June 2011, at about 5 a.m. local time, Russian occupation troops and Abkhazian gangs entered the village of Pichori in the Gali District and abused and physically assaulted the local population and detained some of the village's inhabitants. The identity of some of the detainees has already been established; they are Tamaz and Temur Orzhania, Gogi Shamatava and Mamuka Baghbaia.

By carrying out such provocative actions, the Russian Federation continues to worsen the situation in Georgia's occupied regions. These events clearly indicate the extent to which human rights and fundamental freedoms are being violated by the Russian occupation regime.

The Georgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs calls upon the international community — and, in particular, upon the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe — to take action in order to prevent the Russian Federation from persecuting ethnic Georgians in Georgia's occupied territories and in order to ensure that the human rights and fundamental freedoms of local populations are protected.

Tbilisi, 10 June 2011

United Nations S/2011/375

Security Council

Distr.: General
20 June 2011

Original: English

**Identical letters dated 20 June 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council**

Upon instruction from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter (see annex) that represents the position of the Syrian Arab Republic on the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force for the period from 1 January to 30 June 2011 (S/2011/359).

I would highly appreciate if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

11-38226 (E) 220611 220611

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## Annex to the identical letters dated 20 June 2011 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

On instructions from my Government, I have the honour to convey to you the position of the Syrian Arab Republic concerning the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) for the period from 1 January to 30 June 2011.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic would like to express its appreciation for the efforts by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and of UNDOF officials in the occupied Syrian Golan to maintain security and peace in the Force's area of operations, in accordance with its mandate. Since the Force was established in 1974, Syria has consistently supported and facilitated its work and respected its mandate. It has also maintained close ties with officials of UNDOF, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In his previous reports, the Secretary-General has always expressed his appreciation for Syria's cooperation, its assiduous efforts to ensure the safety of UNDOF troops and its respect for the Force's mandate.

Given that the mandate is based on the purposes and principles of the Charter, and governed by the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces, the Syrian Arab Republic is therefore surprised that the Secretary-General's report, which relates to UNDOF, should make reference to Syrian internal affairs. Paragraph 2 of the report indicates that anti-Government demonstrations in the Syrian Arab Republic spread to several villages in the area of limitation. This attempt to link events currently taking place in Syria with the UNDOF report is inappropriate and unacceptable. It constitutes flagrant interference by the Secretariat in the internal affairs of one of the Organization's founding States, and an attempt to misrepresent the Israeli occupation of the Syrian Golan. It is also unacceptable to simplify the matter to such a degree, as Syria is capable of resorting to alternatives, should it wish to do so.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic also rejects the distortions contained in the report and the incorrect assertion that the Syrian security forces and authorities supervised the gatherings that took place in the area of separation. It is well known that the gatherings were a spontaneous popular response to commemorate the painful memories of the 1948 Nakbah and the 1967 Naksah. Force officials are aware of the efforts that the relevant Syrian authorities made to prevent the situation from escalating.

The true causes of those popular gatherings are Israel's continued disregard of international resolutions, its continued usurpation of Arabs' lands and rights, and its evasion of the requirements of a just and comprehensive peace, as well as the inability of the United Nations to fulfil its responsibility under the Charter and relevant resolutions.

The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic condemns those blatant acts of aggression and calls on the international community to take immediate measures to hold Israel accountable for those crimes. We believe that, in the report, the

Secretariat should have focused on those important and relevant matters, instead of providing the pretext being sought by certain Security Council members, which were waiting for such language in order to justify the adoption of a resolution targeting Syria.

The Syrian Arab Republic recently informed the Secretariat that it would follow its previous practice and would agree to only a six-month extension of the mandate of UNDOF, that is to say, until 31 December 2011. Furthermore, we would like to emphasize that it is important not to introduce distortions aimed at diverting for other purposes the resolution whereby the Force's mandate is extended. The Presidential statement should also be adopted, as in previous years.

Syria has repeatedly called for just and comprehensive peace in Middle East to be reached on the basis of Security Council resolutions, in particular resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 497 (1981), the Arab Peace Initiative and the other relevant terms of reference.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

United Nations A/65/871–S/2011/376

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
22 June 2011

Original: English

**General Assembly**
**Sixty-fifth session**
Agenda item 34
**Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development**

**Security Council**
**Sixty-sixth year**

## Identical letters dated 21 June 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit the statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia regarding the kidnapping of 10 residents from the village of Ghari, Oni district (see annex).

I should be grateful if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the sixty-fifth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 34, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Alexander **Lomaia**
Permanent Representative

11-38521 (E) 230611

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## Annex to the identical letters dated 21 June 2011 from the Permanent Representative of Georgia to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

## Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia on the kidnapping of 10 residents from the village of Ghari, Oni district

On the evening of 18 June 2011, Russian occupants kidnapped, from the territory adjacent to St. George Church across the occupation line, 10 residents of the village of Ghari, Oni district, namely, Lasha Markoishvili, David Jeladze, Vitali Samkharadze, Tornike Jeladze, Beso Jeladze, Dito Markoishvili, Giorgi Markoishvili, Giorgi Metreveli, Vaso Markoishvili and Gia Kakrashvili. The kidnapped citizens were transferred to the occupied Tskhinvali.

Of particular concern is the fact that the Russian occupants committed this criminal act against the peaceful citizens, who had assembled to celebrate "Sajvareoba" — the religious festival which Georgians and Ossetians have been celebrating together for centuries.

It is not the first incident of the Russian occupants kidnapping peaceful citizens. They continue to defiantly neglect the norms and principles of international law, which results in complete chaos ensuing on the occupied territories, as well as gross violations of human rights on a massive scale.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia demands from Russia the unconditional and immediate release of the detained Georgian citizens.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Georgia also calls on the international community to exert maximum efforts to compel the Russian Federation to provide access to international monitoring missions to Georgia's occupied territories, and to commit to the non-use of force, as well as to the full and immediate de-occupation of the Georgian territory.

Tbilisi, 20 June 2011

United Nations S/2011/377

Security Council

Distr.: General
21 June 2011
English
Original: French

## Letter dated 21 June 2011 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to draw your attention to resolution 1973 (2011), by which the Security Council requested me to create for an initial period of one year, in consultation with the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1970 (2011) concerning the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, a group of up to eight experts, which would be placed under the direction of the Committee and would carry out the tasks listed in paragraph 24 of the resolution.

Accordingly, I wish to inform you that, in addition to the seven experts whom I have already appointed and following consultations with the Committee, I have appointed the following expert to serve on the group of experts:

Mr. Simon Dilloway, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland (finance)

The group of experts now has eight members, its maximum authorized complement.

I should be grateful if you would bring this letter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

11-38452 (E) 230611 230611

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